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FEDERAL RIGHTS, FEDERAL FORUM:

SECTION 1983 CHALLENGES TO STATE
CONVICTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT
INTRODUCTION

The protection of individual rights requires more than the mere
enumeration of such rights in constitutions and bills of rights. When
rights are violated, a remedy is needed.' To illustrate this point, consider the following hypothetical. A, a law student, takes part in a

campus protest against American military intervention in some faraway land. The police quickly arrive on the scene of the protest and
begin to clear the main street on campus. The protest is non-violent,
but there is palpable tension between the police and the student pro2 for class, A is well aware of
testers. Having just read Hess v. Indiana
her First Amendment rights. Thus, as she and the other students are
being directed to leave the area, A says, "We'll take the fucking street
later." At that point, she is arrested and later charged with disorderly
conduct through use of obscene language.3 At her trial, A raises the
defense that her speech was protected by the First Amendment under
Hess, but she is convicted anyway. The state appellate court affirms
the conviction, and the state high court and the Supreme Court decline to hear the case. A's state conviction thus stands, despite the
precedents in her favor,4 and she has exhausted her state appeals. In
this hypothetical, A has the right of free speech in theory, but without
a remedy, she is denied that right in practice.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."). See also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987) ("[A] right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish.").
2 414 U.S. 105 (1973). Hess involved a student protester convicted of disorderly conduct
for saying, during a Vietnam protest rally and within earshot of a police officer, "We'll take the
fucking street later," or "We'll take the fucking street again." Id. at 107.
3 This part of the hypothetical draws on Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 778 F.2d
998, 999-1000 (3d Cir. 1985), in which a young woman challenged her conviction for disorderly
conduct through use of obscene language. Pringle's arrest and conviction stemmed from her
directing language similar to Hess's at police officers.
4 In addition to Hess, A could point to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(holding that the word "fluck" printed on the back of a jacket was not obscene because it was not
erotic).
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At this point, A's remedy-i.e., her means of challenging her
state conviction in federal court-will depend on the nature of the
sanction imposed by the state. If A is sentenced to jail or prison, even
for a relatively short time, she will have recourse to a federal district
court by means of the federal habeas corpus statute. 5 If A is merely
fined, however, she will not have a federal remedy under the habeas
statute because the federal habeas statute requires that the habeas applicant be "in custody. ' '6 The habeas statute may not be A's only recourse, however-perhaps she can challenge her state conviction in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983, as it is commonly called, provides a federal remedy for the violation of federally protected rights when the violation
occurs under the color of state law.8 Originally passed as the first
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1983 was part of the "profound revolution in federalism" following the Civil War.9 In passing
the Act, the Forty-Second Congress addressed the unwillingness of
state governments to protect the rights of newly freed AfricanAmerican citizens from violence.' 0 Section 1983 creates a remedy for
violations of federally protected rights under color of state law by
empowering the federal courts to intervene in matters originally left
to the states. This power was needed during Reconstruction to provide a remedy in federal court for the violation of rights secured under the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment." Given the broad
language of the statute, A seems to have a strong case under § 1983,
claiming that her federal rights have been violated by her state conviction under color of state law.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp. 1998). This was the case in Pringle,778 F.2d at 1000,
in which the Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Pringle's habeas petition. Pringle had been sentenced to 10-30 days in prison. See id.
6 See infra Part LB (discussing habeas corpus and the custody requirement).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
8 The relevant part of the statute reads: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." Id.
Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will
the Statute Remain Alive or FadeAway?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
10 See 1 MARTIN A. ScHwARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,

DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.3 (2d ed. 1991) ("The 42d Congress ...found that a federal remedy
was essential to correct deprivations of federal rights, because state authorities were either unable or unwilling to control the widespread violence of the Ku Klux Klan against blacks and
their supporters.").
1 See id. § 1.4 (discussing the "vital function" played by § 1983 in providing a remedy
for violations of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Section 1983 "neither creates
rights nor establishes jurisdiction." Id. The rights protected by § 1983 are not found in § 1983
itself, but in the Constitution or in federal laws.
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This Note addresses the issue raised by this hypothetical:
whether the validity of state convictions can be challenged in the federal courts using § 1983. Although the Supreme Court has held that
individuals in state custody may not use § 1983 to circumvent the
more exacting requirements of habeas corpus review,12 the answer for
those individuals (like A) who are not in custody, and thus do not
have access to the federal courts through habeas corpus, is not clear.
Supreme Court Justices have recently addressed this issue, however,
in Heck v. Humphrey'3 and Spencer v. Kemna.14 Although neither of
these cases dealt with the issue directly, Justice Souter argued in con-

curring opinions in both cases that § 1983 provides a federal forum to
challenge the validity of state convictions when habeas corpus relief
is not available. In Spencer, a majority of the Court agreed with Justice Souter on this point. In doing so, a majority of the present Court
appears to have accepted a broad reading of both § 1983 and the powers of the federal courts to intervene in matters traditionally left to the
state courts. Interestingly, this interpretation of § 1983 runs counter
15
to much of the Rehnquist Court's recent federalism jurisprudence.
A number of other recent cases illuminate the contemporary Court's
concern with limiting the power of the federal courts
1 6 when state governments and important state functions are at issue.

12 The writ of habeas corpus is "[a] writ directed to the person detaining another, and

commanding him to produce the... person detained.... the purpose of which is to test the
legality of the detention or imprisonment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990). For
a discussion of habeas corpus, see infra Part LB.
'3 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
'4 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
s In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), for example, the Court struck down a
federal law passed under the Commerce Clause for the first time since the 1930s, holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of Congress's legislative power. In
1997, the Court held in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), that provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the residual sovereignty of the states by requiring state executives to carry out a federal regulatory program. In that same term the Court
held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), that states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court cannot be abrogated by a federal statute in the absence of an express constitutional provision granting Congress that power. Seminole Tribe has been called "an
unprecedented limit on the ability to hold state governments accountable in federal court."
Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalismand Functionalism in FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 959, 960 (1997). The Rehnquist Court seems serious about protecting the immunity of
state governments from suit, having held in the 1998 Term that state governments cannot be
sued in federal court for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act or patent law. See, e.g.,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (involving the Fair Labor Standards Act); College Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (involving the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act).
One prominent scholar has commented that,
"[c]umulatively, these federalism rulings are the Rehnquist Court's most dramatic change in
constitutional law." Erwin Chemerinsky, Permission to Litigate, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 42,
43.
16 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
decision as "prevent[ing] Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions
against States").

356

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 51:353

State governments' autonomy should yield, however, where federally protected rights are concerned. Because of the need for a remedy when rights are violated, this Note argues that the Court should
adopt Justice Souter's position on § 1983 challenges to state convictions in federal court. Part I provides some historical and legal background on § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute. The habeas
corpus statute is discussed because of the similarities between § 1983
challenges to state convictions and habeas corpus review. Part II
analyzes the statutory overlap of § 1983 and habeas corpus in more
detail, discussing the cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed
the complex relationship between the two statutes. Part I concludes
by discussing Justice Souter's concurrences in Heck and Spencer as
well as the response of the lower federal courts to his position. Part
Im builds on Justice Souter's argument that individuals claiming violations of their federally protected rights should have access to a federal forum under § 1983. A major premise of this argument is that the
federal courts are better suited to protect the federal rights of individuals than the state courts. In short, Justice Souter appears to reject
parity between the state and federal courts, an assumption central to a
number of important § 1983 cases in recent decades. Part In argues
that this rejection of parity is more persuasive than the alternative
conclusion that there is parity between the state and federal courts,
given both empirical and historical considerations as well as the legislative purpose in enacting § 1983. Part IV discusses the application
of the issue preclusion doctrine in § 1983 actions, under which one
cannot relitigate in federal court issues that have been previously decided in state court. Because a federal forum is necessary to protect
federal rights, Part IV argues that this doctrine must be reconsidered
and rejected in this particular context. Finally, Part V discusses concerns with judicial economy and finality in allowing § 1983 challenges to state convictions in federal court.
I. SECTION 1983 AND HABEAS CORPUS
A. Section 1983
Section 1983 has been called the most important provision in
contemporary federal law. 17 Although this may be something of an
overstatement, § 1983 is significant both in terms of its historical effects and the sheer volume of actions brought under it every year.
Historically, many landmark cases in constitutional law have been
brought under § 1983,18 including Brown v. Board of Education,19
17 See 1 ScHwARTz & KIRKLIN, supra note 10, § 1.1 ("No federal statute is more important in contemporary American law than 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
'8 See id. (listing important constitutional cases brought under § 1983).
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Reynolds v. Sims,20 Roe v. Wade, 21 and, more recently, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.22 In terms of sheer volume, § 1983 is cer-

tainly an important statute, with more than 30,000 § 1983 actions

filed every year. 23 This litigation explosion under § 1983 is remarkable given that the statute was little used before it was revived by the
seminal case of Monroe v. Pape.24 In the year Monroe was decided,
1961, only 270 § 1983 actions had been filed.'2
The typical § 1983 action involves plaintiffs bringing state officials into federal court as defendants; thus, § 1983 raises a number of
federalism concerns. Proponents of a broad reading of § 1983 emphasize that the intended purpose of the statute when originally enacted in 1871 was to provide a federal forum for alleged violations of
federally protected rights by state officials acting under color of state
law. Justice Blackmun, for example, argued that "Reconstruction...
established a new legal order that contemplated direct federal intervention in what had been considered to be state affairs, a system in
which federal courts were to enforce newly created federal constitutional rights against state officials through civil remedies." 26 In this
new legal order, § 1983 would provide those civil remedies. 27 Under
this view, complaints that § 1983 litigation is "inconsistent with the
thesis that federal courts not interfere with state affairs unless absolutely necessary 28 simply misunderstand the legislative purpose behind § 1983.29 As the Supreme Court has held:

'9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

20 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

22 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
23 See 1 SCHWARTZ & KIRKLiN, supra note 10, § 1.1. Most of these actions are filed in
federal courts, but § 1983 actions can be filed in state courts as well.
24 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe held that the phrase "under color of law" in § 1983 applied to
actions that were not authorized by state law but were instead illegal, such as the unreasonable
search and seizure at issue in that case. See id. at 172-174. Previous to Monroe, § 1983 was
thus limited to challenging unconstitutional state laws; after Monroe, § 1983 offered access to a
federal forum to anyone claiming a violation of his or her federally protected rights. See generally 1 SCHWARTZ & KMRKLIN, supra note 10, § 1.1 ('Monroe established that the federal § 1983
remedy is independent of and 'supplementary to' any available state law remedies.").
2 See IScHwARTrZ& KiRKLN, supranote 10, § 1.1.
26 Blackmun, supra note 9, at 7-8.
27 In this way, § 1983 plays a vital role, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize
or create remedies for the rights extended against the state governments. See 1 ScHwART &
KIRKLtN, supra note 10, § 1.4 ("Although the Fourteenth Amendment establishes binding standards of conduct for state and local governments, it does not authorize remedies when its provisions are breached. Section 1983 fills this void.").
28 Blackmun, supranote 9,at 2.
29 See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.KENT L.REV. 695, 697 (1997) [hereinafter Beermann, Common Law Elements] ("Mhe statute[]
[has] not been allowed to reach [its] full textual potential, largely because the Court has constructed numerous limiting doctrines .... "); Jack M. Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section
1983 With SpecialAttention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 52 (1989) ("Commenta-
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Section 1983 was... a product of a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late
18th century .... The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the peo-

ple from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
30
"whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.,

For the federal courts to properly play this role of "guardians of the
people's federal rights," they must directly intervene in affairs that,
under more restrictive understandings of federalism, are none of their
business.
Whatever the merits of this broad reading of § 1983, it has not
generally been adopted by the federal courts. Instead, the federal
courts have relied on a number of doctrines to limit the scope of federal review of alleged violations of federally protected rights under
color of state law. As one leading treatise notes, § 1983 defendants
have "a storehouse of defenses to choose from," and that § 1983 is, as
a result, "a comprehensive, intricate, and, in many respects, complex
body of law. 32 Perhaps the most important of these defenses is the
application of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, to § 1983 actions. 3 In Allen v. McCurry,34 the Supreme Court held that the
closely related preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to § 1983 actions. The § 1983 plaintiff in Allen had been
tried and convicted of drug offenses and assault in state court, and,
while in custody, filed a § 1983 action claiming that the police had
tors have long attacked the Court's method of construing § 1983, charging the Court with ignoring congressional intent ...").
30 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972) (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1879)).
31 In addition to res judicata and collateral estoppel, other doctrines limiting federal review of state action under § 1983 include various forms of abstention and the absolute and
qualified immunity doctrines. For discussions of these doctrines, see generally KAREN M.
BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, chs. 6-9 (1998).

32 1 SCHwARTz & KIRKLIN, supra note 10, § 1.2. These multiple defenses, according to
Schwartz and Kirklin, "involve the reconciliation of important competing interests" raised by §
1983, including the federal interest in providing a remedy and the states' interests in their basic
functions and autonomy. Id. See also Zeigler, supra note 1, at 665 ("[Ihe chief legacy of the
Burger Court may be the creation of impediments to the enforcement of rights.").
33 A prior judgment may preclude a future action in one of two closely related ways. See
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1 (2d ed. 1993). First, res judicata, often

called claim preclusion, "prevents a plaintiff from suing on a claim that already has been decided." Id. at 610. Second, estoppel by judgment, or issue preclusion, "precludes relitigation of
any issue.., if that particular issue actually was contested and decided in the first action." l
Estoppel by judgment is called collateral estoppel, its more common name, when the second
lawsuit is collateral to the first, i.e., not the same claim as the first lawsuit. Collateral estoppel is
much more common than the other form of estoppel by judgment, direct estoppel. See id. at
610-11. Because § 1983 challenges to state convictions involve a civil action brought to challenge a criminal conviction, the relevant doctrine is collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
3 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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violated his Fourth Amendment rights in an illegal search. Because
of the Court's holding in Stone v. Powell, 35 this Fourth Amendment
claim could not be brought under habeas corpus, and thus the Allen
plaintiffs only hope for federal review of his state conviction was §
1983. The Court, however, refused to accept "a generally framed
principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one
unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district
court. ' 36 Such a principle, the Court held, could not be found in the
Constitution, which does not grant that jurisdiction to the federal
courts.37 More surprisingly, the Allen 3Court
also held that this princi8
ple could not be found in § 1983 itself.
In addition to the traditional preclusion doctrines, the Court's
reasoning in Allen was also based on the Full Faith and Credit Act.39
Passed by the First Congress in 1790,40 the Full Faith and Credit statute reads, in part: "[Jludicial proceedings [of any court of any State]
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage inthe courts of such State ....,,41
In Allen, the Court held
that § 1983 did not repeal the Full Faith and Credit Act by implication.42 Thus, the common-law doctrine of issue preclusion and the
Full Faith and Credit Act, taken together, limit the ability of individuals convicted in state courts to relitigate issues in federal court, despite the broad language of § 1983. In two limited situations, however, Allen does permit an individual convicted in a state court to litigate issues related to that conviction in federal court. First, issues
may be relitigated in federal court "where the party against whom an
earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court.'
Second, under the terms of the Full Faith and Credit Act, a party may
relitigate an issue in federal court if the earlier adjudication would not
5 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner be granted federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 481-82. The effect of Stone was
that the Allen plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim could not be reviewed by a federal court
sitting in habeas.
3 Allen, 449 U.S. at 103.
37 See id.
38 See id.
3' 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
40 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 96 n.8 (noting that the act has remained essentially unchanged

since 1790).
41

Id. at 96 (alterations in original) (quoting § 1738).

42 See id. at 97-98 ("[N]othing in the language of § 1983 remotely expresses any congres-

sional intent to... repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. §
1738. Section 1983 creates a new federal cause of action. It says nothing about the preclusive
effect of state-court judgments.") (citation and footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 101.
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be given preclusive effect in the courts of that state. 44 Ifan individual
raises constitutional defenses in the state court, however, it is generally safe to say that Allen bars the relitigation of those issues in federal court. 45
Importantly, the Allen Court explicitly rejected the idea that §
1983 embodies "a general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to
render correct decisions on constitutional issues. ''A6 Such a general
distrust of state courts' capacity to respect constitutional rights, however, is one of the basic tenets of the broad reading of § 1983. If the
federal courts were to adopt a broader reading of § 1983, then Allen
would require reconsideration. For § 1983 to provide a meaningful
federal forum for the vindication of federal rights in cases involving
state convictions not resulting in incarceration, some revision of the
preclusive effects of state-court judgments is essential. 47
In contrast to § 1983 actions, the review of state convictions by a
federal court sitting in habeas is not limited by the prior adjudication
of issues in state court. 48 But many individuals do not have access to
a federal forum using habeas corpus, primarily because federal habeas
corpus review is limited to petitions from individuals in state custody.
This is discussed in the next section.
B. Habeas Corpus
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 extended the right to a federal
writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners.4 9 In the terms of the statute,
however, habeas relief is limited to those individuals who are "in
custody." 50 This limitation follows from the traditional role of habeas
corpus: "Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government
must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his imme-

44 See id.
45

See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4471.2

(West Supp. 2000) (explaining that federal courts will rarely find that state defendants did not
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court).
46 Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.
47 See infra Part IV.
48 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 356 (5th ed. 1994) ("[R]es
judicata does not bar habeas corpus, and the mere fact that the contention has been presented to,
and rejected by, the state courts does not prevent the federal court from giving relief.").
49 Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp. 1998). On the long history of habeas as a
protection of individual rights, see generally 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 108-25 (1926) (discussing the historical development of the writ of habeas corpus from the
reign of Edward I).
50 Section 2254(a) reads, in part: "The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or
a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody ......
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diate release." 5' Thus, the custody requirement "preserve[s] the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty. Since habeas ... is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional
rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of
special urgency. 52 The custody requirement is jurisdictional, i.e., if a
habeas petitioner is not in custody at the time the habeas petition is
filed, then the federal court does not have jurisdiction to consider the
petition.53 In cases in which individual freedom is not at stake, the
habeas statute does not grant federal jurisdiction to intervene in matters of state concern.54

In short, the federal habeas corpus statute

grants state prisoners a federal forum because of the important interests at stake.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of custody to include individuals not in actual physical custody,
but who were subject to conditions that "significantly restrain [the]
petitioner's liberty to do those things which in this country free men
are entitled to do." 55 Thus, individuals released on parole56 or even
on personal recognizance 57 have been held to be "in custody," despite
the lack of physical restraint. In addition, at least one court has held
that community service constitutes custody for habeas purposes.5
But there are still limits to what constitutes custody: "[T]here must be
some significant restraint b the state on the petitioner's liberty in
order for the action to lie."5 Fines, for example, have not been held
to be a sufficiently important60restraint to give rise to federal jurisdiction under the habeas statute.
However, one need not be "in custody" when the federal court
actually decides on the merits of the habeas petition. Once federal
jurisdiction has attached, a habeas petition is not rendered moot by

51 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72 (1977).

52 Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
53 See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) ("[O]nce the federal jurisdiction has

attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of preceedings on [habeas] application[s].").
5 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Habeas jurisprudence has
traditionally been concerned with liberty rather than property, with freedom more than economics.").
55 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,243 (1963).
' See id.
57 See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.

58 See Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dep't, 128 F.3d 152, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1997).
59 Ward v. Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1984).
60 See, e.g., Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[Wle hold that
the ordinary collateral consequences or civil disabilities flowing from a fine-only conviction,
although they may be restraints on liberty, are not severe enough to put the convicted person in
custody... :).
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the petitioner's release in most cases. 61 The general rule is that a
criminal conviction carries sufficient collateral consequences to present a live case and controversy, despite the petitioner's release from
custody. 62 The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction,
which may constitute great enough restraints on individual liberty to
prevent a habeas petition from being rendered moot by release, however, are generally not great enough to alone constitute custody and
give rise to federal jurisdiction: "The existence of collateral consequences of his conviction may enable a prisoner who has fully served
a sentence he wished to challenge to avoid being dismissed on mootness grounds, but it will not suffice to satisfy the 'in custody' jurisdictional prerequisite unless .. .federal jurisdiction has already attached. 63 In other words, the federal courts have developed two
threshold levels for considering habeas petitions, a custody threshold
and a collateral-consequences threshold. The custody threshold involves the restraint on individual liberty necessary to give rise to federal jurisdiction. The collateral-consequences threshold is the level to
which collateral consequences of a conviction must rise to prevent a
habeas petition from being rendered moot by release from custody.
Importantly, this second threshold is set at a much lower level than
the first, because a criminal conviction is generally enough to prevent
a habeas petition from being rendered moot, but nevera enough, without custody, to establish federal jurisdiction by itself
These different threshold levels for jurisdiction and mootness
are, to a great extent, arbitrary. If habeas corpus were just about release from custody, then release would always render a habeas petition moot. Instead, the courts have interpreted the federal habeas corpus statute as providing a federal forum to ensure that federally protected rights have not been violated and that the need for this forum

6! See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) ("[O]nce the federal jurisdiction has
attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.").
62 The Carafas Court illustrated the rule in the following manner:
It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In consequence of his conviction, he
cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union
for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York
State; he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these "disabilities or burdens [which]
may flow from" petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the judgment
of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211,
212 (1946)). The required degree of specificity of the disabilities following upon a challenged
conviction is not clear. Cf D.S.A. v. Circuit Court Branch 1, 942 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.
1991) ("'Collateral review of a final judgment is not an endeavor to be undertaken lightly. It is
not warranted absent a showing that the complainant suffers actual harm from the judgment that
he seeks to avoid."') (quoting Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 n.13 (1982)).
63 Ward, 738 F.2d at 138-39.
64 See Carafas,391 U.S. at 237-38 (discussing these mootness and jurisdictional issues).
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exists even after release.65 But the courts have not allowed access to
federal habeas review in all cases, despite the important interests at
stake. Courts faced with this issue have generally not commented on
this inconsistency. In Hanson v. Circuit Court,however, the Seventh
Circuit squarely addressed this issue:
Admittedly, once the notion that custody means only confinement within the four walls of a prison is abandoned,
finding a principled basis upon which to draw lines is difficult. We must, however, attach some meaning to the Congressional limitation on habeas corpus jurisdiction; Congress
did not authorize the federal courts to be roving commissions
to correct all constitutional errors in state criminal proceedings.... The Supreme Court has declared the purpose of the
custody requirement to be "to preserve the writ of habeas
corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty." We hold that a fine-only conviction is not a restraint
on individual liberty. Moreover, we hold that the ordinary
collateral consequences or civil disabilities flowing from a
fine-only conviction... are not severe enough to put the person6in
6 custody within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.
In this passage, the Hanson court identifies two closely related
problems with extending the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts.
First, the habeas statute does include the phrase "in custody," and, as
the Hanson court asserts, "some meaning" must be given to those
words.67 But as the Hanson court itself appears to concede, no "principled basis" has been put forward for the meaning the courts have
SCf. Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L REV. 991, 1009-10
(1985). Professor Yackle argues:
In sum, it was the nature of litigants' federal claims, rather than their interest in
raising them, that motivated the Justices' decisions making postconviction habeas
generally available. The writ's association with personal liberty made it an entirely
appropriate vehicle for the Court's strategy to protect individuals from recalcitrant
state authorities. Yet the "custody" requirement was merely a traditional component
of habeas. It quickly gave ground whenever it threatened to interfere with the development of an effective system of federal postconviction review. When habeas
was recruited to new service for the protection of fourteenth amendment rights,
"custody" offered an expedient and facially acceptable justification for federal judicial action notwithstanding previous litigation in state court. It would have been
nonsense, however, to take 'custody' seriously . . . . [Instead,] [t]he Court...
blithely departed from the historical doctrine that habeas applicants must be physically confined. Today, "custody" serves a symbolic function. It would be a serious
mistake to believe that it offers a sound basis for determining the availability of federal adjudication.

lId (footnotes omitted).
6 Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir, 1979) (citation and footnote
omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345,350 (1978)).
67 id.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 51:353

chosen.68 Second, the Hanson court asserts that "Congress did not
authorize the federal courts to be roving commissions to correct all
constitutional errors in state criminal proceedings. 69 This merely
begs the question, however. The issue is not whether Congress has
authorized the federal courts, under the habeas statute, to correct all
constitutional errors made in the state courts. The current rules of
habeas corpus, including the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies and the doctrine of state procedural default, make this perfectly
clear. 70 The real question is: which constitutional violations has Congress authorized federal courts to correct in habeas proceedings, and
how can the courts distinguish between those constitutional violations
federal courts can correct and those they cannot?
Given the requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody, and
the courts' definition of "custody," those convicted of state crimes,
but not sentenced to incarceration, probation, or even community
service, have no access to a federal forum to challenge their conviction under the habeas statute. This is true despite the collateral consequences that often follow from the mere fact of a criminal conviction. In addition to the collateral consequences of the conviction itself, other forms of punishment may be implicated, such as a fine or a
revocation of a license. Moreover, individuals who have never been
in custody have also been denied access to a federal forum under §
1983 because the federal courts have generally interpreted habeas
corpus as the exclusive means of challenging a state conviction in
federal court.71 This interpretation of habeas corpus is based in large
part on two important Supreme Court precedents. Part II analyzes
these precedents and the more recent developments indicating that §
1983 may be a viable option for those individuals denied access to a
federal forum under the habeas statute.
I. WHEN HABEAS AND § 1983 COLLIDE: PREISER, HECK, AND THE
UNSETTLED STATE OF THE LAW
A. Preiser v. Rodriguez
The Supreme Court first addressed the relationship between §
1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute in 1973 in Preiserv. Rod69

Id.
Id.

70

See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND

68

PROCEDURE § 22.1 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the "elaborate procedural obstacles" to habeas
relief today, including "procedural default"). See also Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Note, Raising the
Defense of ProceduralDefault Sua Sponte: Who Will Enforce the Great Writ of Liberty?, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 871 (2000) (criticizing recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
access to habeas corpus).
71 See, e.g., Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that § 1983 cannot
be used when an individual does not have access to habeas because he is no longer in custody).
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iguez.72 Preiserwas a consolidated appeal involving challenges by
three New York state prisoners to the revocation of their goodconduct-time credits for disciplinary reasons.73 Instead of proceeding
under habeas corpus, however, the prisoners chose to proceed under §
1983, alleging that the New York Department of Correctional Services had acted unconstitutionally when it revoked their credits. The
prisoners sought an injunction to restore the credits and thus, in effect,
to reduce the length of their confinement. 74 These state prisoners attempted to bring their action under § 1983 rather than under habeas
corpus because they wished to evade the requirement, under the habeas corpus statute, that they first exhaust their state remedies before
seeking federal review. 75 Given the broad language of § 1983, the
Preiserprisoners appeared to have a good case. The prison officials
who revoked the credits were certainly acting under color of state
law, and thus the allegation that the prisoners' federally protected
rights had been violated brought the case under the "literal terms of
that statute. 7 6 The issue before the Court in Preiser, then, was
whether the specific language of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
77
§ 2254, or the more general statute, § 1983, applied in this instance.
The Court held that the specific habeas statute did in fact take precedence over the more general § 1983.78
The Preiser holding was motivated, to a large extent, by the
Court's unwillingness to allow state prisoners to evade the exhaustion
requirements of the habeas statute. 79 The PreiserCourt reasoned that,
in adding the exhaustion requirements to the habeas statute in 1948,
Congress expressed concern for "federal-state comity," defined as "'a
proper respect for state functions."' 80 Comity was more than a matter
of federal courts not interfering with the state courts; it extended to
state administrative bodies, as well.81 The Court stressed the importance of the state interest involved: "It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the
administration of its prisons., 8 2 Given Congress's intent that the fed72 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
7' See id.

74See id. at 476-77.
71 See id. at 477.
76 Id.at 488.
77 See id. at 482.
78 See id. at 500 ("Upon that question, we hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment... his sole federal remedy is a

writ of habeas corpus.").
79 See id. at 503-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("At bottom, the Court's holding today rests
on an understandable apprehension that the no-exhaustion rule of § 1983 might, in the absence
of some limitation, devour the exhaustion rule of the habeas corpus statute.").
o l at 491 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971)).
s, See id.,at490-91.
82 Id. at 491-92.
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eral courts show a proper respect for important state functions such as
prison administration, the PreiserCourt held that prisoners should not
be allowed to frustrate that intent by using the broad language of §
1983 to evade the exhaustion requirement of habeas corpus.
Preiser left three important questions unanswered. First, because Preiserdealt with prisoners' access to a federal forum using
habeas corpus, the Court did not address the use of § 1983 by those
without access to habeas corpus relief. The Court's broad holding
that habeas corpus is "the exclusive federal remedy for a state prisoner attacking his confinement 8 3 was interpreted by some federal
courts to mean that habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for
individuals attacking their state convictions.84 This conclusion, based
on the questionable extension of a rule from the context of custody to
that of non-custodial convictions, has 85not been reached by all federal
courts considering the issue, however.
Second, under Preiser'sinterpretation of § 1983 and the habeas
statute, some prisoner suits could still proceed under § 1983. The
PreiserCourt reasoned that "the essence of habeas corpus is an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody., 86 This rule applies when the prisoners' challenge would lead
to immediate release, if successful, or, as in Preiser,to a speedier release. 7 Thus, "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or
83

Id. at 493 (emphasis added).

8' See, e.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 140-41 (7th Cir. 1980)

(rejecting a corporation's § 1983 action challenging a state conviction); Hanson v. Circuit Court,
591 F.2d 404, 409-410 (7th Cir. 1979) ("We think that Congress intended that habeas corpus
provide . . . the exclusive federal remedy for all who seek to attack state court judgments of
convictions."); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the dismissal of
a § 1983 action challenging convictions for which the sentences had already been served).
85 For an excellent comparison of the two positions on Preiser'seffects on § 1983 actions
by those not in custody, see Pueschel v. Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Conn. 1974). The
Pueschel court explained:
It might be contended that Congress, in enacting the habeas corpus remedy, not only
intended it to be the exclusive vehicle for district court collateral inquiry into the validity of state convictions but also intended that those convictions not subject to a
habeas remedy, i.e., without custody consequences, should be immune from district
court collateral inquiry. In the absence of helpful legislative history, it seems at least
as plausible to argue that the unavailability of habeas corpus to attack a sentence involving only a fine is a sufficient reason for permitting collateral inquiry via § 1983.
Id. The Pueschel court avoided granting the § 1983 plaintiff relief by holding that his action
was barred by issue preclusion, as the issues in his action had already been decided against him
in state court. See id. at 583 ("[C]ollateral estoppel should bar the suit."). As argued infra Part
IV, however, such a result is inconsistent with the legislative purposes in enacting § 1983 and
thus, fundamentally flawed.
86 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). It should be noted that Justice Brennan, in dissent, strongly objected to this premise: "The Court's conclusion . . . is assertedly
justified by invocation of a concept, newly invented by the Court today, variously termed the
'core of habeas corpus,' the 'heart of habeas corpus,' and the 'essence of habeas corpus."' Id. at
503 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 489.
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duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.,, 88 When a prisoner is "attacking something other than
the fact or length of his confinement," or is seeking "something other
than immediate or more speedy release," however, habeas corpus is
not his exclusive remedy, and the prisoner may proceed under §
1983." 9 Since Preiser,then, the federal courts have wrestled with the
difficult task of determining whether a claim challenges the fact or
duration of a prisoner's imprisonment (cognizable only under habeas), or merely the conditions of that confinement (cognizable under
§ 1983). 90
Third, because the Preiserprisoners sought only an injunction
restoring their credits and not monetary damages, the Court did not
squarely address the issue of whether state prisoners could attack their
imprisonment indirectly by seeking damages under § 1983. The Preiser Court appeared to suggest, however, that a suit for damages could
be brought under § 1983: "If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is
attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement,
and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy
release-the traditional purpose of habeas corpus." 91 Moreover, the
Court stressed that a damages claim could not be brought under the
habeas corpus statute, and thus that a state prisoner seeking damages
would have to proceed under
§ 1983.92 The Court addressed this is93
sue in Heck v. Humphrey.
B. Heck v. Humphrey
Preisersuggested that a state prisoner might be able to challenge
his or her state conviction by bringing a § 1983 action for damages, as
opposed to an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. In Heck
v. Humphrey, the Court returned to the "intersection of the two most
fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation,' 94 § 1983 and habeas corpus. Roy Heck, the petitioner in Heck, had been convicted of
manslaughter in Indiana state court and was appealing that conviction
Il at500.
89 Id. at 494.
90 Sorting out which claims implicate the fact or duration of confinement is not always a
88

simple matter. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued FrustratingConflict
Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners,37 DEPAUL L. REV.

85 (1988) (discussing the difficulties federal courts experience determining whether a particular
prisoner action challenges the fact or duration of confinement).
91

92

Preiser,411U.S. at494.
See iti. ("In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or avail-

able federal remedy.").
9' 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
94 Idl at 480.
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in the Indiana courts.95 While that appeal was still pending, Heck
filed a § 1983 action in federal court, naming two state prosecutors
and a police investigator as defendants. Heck alleged that these individuals had violated his federally protected rights by, among other
things, destroying exculpatory evidence. 96 In his § 1983 action, Heck
did not request an injunction ordering his release but instead
97 sought
only monetary damages for his allegedly illegal conviction.
Heck's § 1983 action presented a Preiserproblem in that "the issues it raised 'directly implicate[d] the legality of [petitioner's] confinement"' 98 despite the absence of a request for injunctive relief ordering his release. In short, Heck was attempting to use § 1983 to
avoid federal habeas requirements and to secure his release from
prison. A successful § 1983 action would have called into question
the validity of Heck's continuing incarceration and would have compelled the state to release him.99 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
held that Heck's claim was not cognizable under § 1983.1°° Heck had
based his claim, however, on Preiser's suggestion that a prisoner
seeking damages was not seeking immediate or speedier release, and
thus the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the "unreliable,
if not unintelligible" implications of Preiseron this issue. 101
Following the rationale of Preiser,the Heck Court held that a
state prisoner's claims were not cognizable under § 1983 where suc95 See id. at 478-79. Eventually, Heck's state conviction was upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court. See id. at 479.
96 See id. at 478-79 (describing the facts of the case).
97 See id. at 479 ("The complaint sought, among other things, compensatory and punitive
monetary damages. It did not ask for injunctive relief, and petitioner has not sought release
from custody in this action.").
9s Id. (quoting the district court's dismissal of the complaint).
99 At least that is what the Heck Court concluded would result from a successful § 1983
action for damages in the case. The Heck Court was not altogether clear on just how the federal
court's judgment would affect later state court proceedings if Heck succeeded in his § 1983
action. In the simplest case, of course, the federal court judgment would have preclusive effect
in subsequent state court proceedings. Writing for the Court, however, Justice Scalia stated that
"it is at least plain that preclusion will not necessarily be an automatic, or even a permissible,
effect" of the federal court's judgment. Id. at 488. Thus, even if Heck prevailed in federal court
and was awarded damages, the state would not automatically be legally compelled to release
him. Because Heck did not present such an issue to the Court, however, Justice Scalia did not
elaborate on this point, unfortunately, see id. at 488 ("[W]e have no occasion to rule on the
matter at this time .... "), but only stated, in a footnote, that federal preclusion rules are judgemade. See id. at 488 n.9 (citing various treatises on the nature of federal preclusion law). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted that a federal court judgment would compel Heck's
release either because of its preclusive effect or because "mounting damages against the defendant-officials for unlawful confinement (damages almost certainly to be paid by state indemnification) would, practically, compel the State to release the prisoner." Id. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring). In any case, Heck is clearly premised on the assumption that the state (or its officials)
could not just pay Heck damages and keep him in prison, despite the fact that the Court did not
rule on this matter directly.
'00 See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993)).
'0' Heck, 512 U.S. at482 ("In the last analysis, we think the dicta of Preisertobean unreliable, if not an unintelligible, guide .... ").

20001

SECTION 1983 CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT

369

cess on those claims would compel the prisoner's immediate or
speedier release. 10 2 But the Heck Court went further than merely extending Preiserto bar § 1983 actions seeking only monetary damages
in such circumstances. Specifically, Heck held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction
or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983.103
In short, the Heck Court held that § 1983 claims by state prisoners for
damages resulting from an illegal conviction or illegal imprisonment
must satisfy a favorable-termination requirement, demonstrating that
their convictions have been invalidated in some other forum prior to
the bringing of damages claims. Favorable termination of prior judicial proceedings in a prisoner's favor is thus an element of a prisoner's § 1983 action for damages from an illegal conviction. The
result is a sweeping rule that § 1983 cannot be used, either directly
(request for injunctive relief ordering release) or indirectly (request
for monetary damages only), to call into question the validity of a
state conviction. Instead, after Heck a state conviction can only be
challenged in state appellate courts or in a federal court sitting in habeas. Only after the conviction has been invalidated in one1°of
4 these
alternative fora may a former prisoner bring a § 1983 action.
The Heck Court based this favorable-termination requirement on
the common law of torts in 1871, the year Congress enacted § 1983.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, analogized Heck's lawsuit to a
suit for malicious prosecution "because ... it permits damages for

'02

See id. at 483.

'a3 Id. at 486-87 (citations omitted).
101It should be noted that Heck does "not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983,
but rather den[ies] the existence of a cause of action." l at 489. The favorable-termination
requirement differs from exhaustion because even a state prisoner who has fully exhausted the
available remedies-including state appeals, federal habeas corpus, and perhaps even an appeal
for an executive pardon-would still not have a cognizable § 1983 action for damages if he had
not succeeded in having his conviction invalidated in some other forum. See id. ("Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the
grant of a writ of habeas corpus.").
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confinement imposed pursuant to legal process."' 0 5 Because favor-

able termination is an element of a suit for malicious prosecution,
Justice Scalia reasoned that it should also be an element of a pris-

oner's § 1983 claim for damages for illegal conviction and imprison-

ment. 1°6 The primary effect of importing this requirement from nine-

teenth-century torts law into a contemporary civil rights action is to
limit the availability of § 1983 in such cases. Justice Scalia emphasized this effect in the Heck opinion, stressing that "[t]his Court has
long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has
10 7
generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack."
The term "collateral attack" describes an action seeking to deprive a
conviction or prior judgment of its normal force and effect in a later
proceeding with a purpose other than overturning or reversing the
prior conviction or judgment. 0 8 Heck's § 1983 action for damages
was a classic example of a collateral attack: although his suit was
brought for damages, if successful it would have also called into
question the validity of his state conviction and compelled his release.
In support of his rejection of collateral attacks on state convictions,
Justice Scalia pointed to "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are
not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments." 1°9 As discussed below, however, Justice Souter
and other members of the Court have proven more willing than Justice Scalia to ignore this "hoary principle" in § 1983 actions.
C. Justice Souter's Heck Concurrence
Despite his criticisms of Justice Scalia's common-law analysis in
Heck,1l0 Justice Souter concurred in the Court's basic holding in
105 Id. at 484.
106 See id. at 483-84. Justice Scalia began by observing that "[w]e have repeatedly noted
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability."' Id. at 483 (alteration in original)
(quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)). He then
asserts that "[t]he common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest
analogy to claims of the type considered here ...... I& at 484. It should be noted, however,
that more recently Justice Scalia has vociferously criticized the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence for
its resemblance to tort law:
The § 1983 that the Court created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to what Congress
enacted almost a century earlier... Monroe changed a statute ... into one that
pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year, and engages this
Court in a losing struggle to prevent the Constitution from degenerating into a general tort law.
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S 477, 484-85 (1994) (citing a number of authorities on this
point).
108 See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 261 (6th
ed. 1990)).
'09 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
110 Justice Souter criticized Heck's argument for the favorable-termination requirement on
two levels. Fst, Justice Souter argued that Justice Scalia had used "common-law analogies to
displace statutory analysis." Id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's use of the
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Heck. Justice Souter suggested, however, that the Court could have
reached essentially the same result by merely applying Preiser's
analysis to § 1983 claims for damages for illegal conviction."' Following Preiser'scentral holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive
means for a state prisoner to challenge a state conviction in federal
court, Justice Souter would have limited Heck to hold that state prisoners cannot evade the requirements of habeas corpus by pursuing a §
1983 action for monetary damages; state prisoners would thus have to
secure habeas relief before filing a claim for damages under §
1983.112 Such a rule, Justice Souter argued, would be consistent with
the purpose of § 1983,113 because habeas corpus relief would still
provide114the state prisoner with a federal forum to hear his federal
claimS.
Justice Souter did not stop there, however. His Heck concurrence went on to address the situation of those individuals who do not
have access to federal habeas corpus review of their state convictions.
His concern with the Court's opinion was that it "would needlessly
common law to supplant statutory analysis in Heck has also been criticized in the scholarly
literature. See Beermann, Common Law Elements, supra note 29, at 713-14 (noting that the
Heck opinion fundamentally alters analysis of § 1983 without arguing for its new method).
Second, Justice Souter argued that there were serious problems with analogizing Heck's
§ 1983 action for damages to an action for malicious prosecution because of the traditional
elements of the malicious-prosecution claim. Unlike the favorable-termination element adopted
by the Court in Heck, Justice Souter pointed out that "other elements of the tort... cannot coherently be transplanted" to a § 1983 action. Heck, 512 U.S. at 493. In a malicious-prosecution
action, the plaintiff must also "prove the absence of probable cause for the proceeding as well as
'malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." Id. at 494
(internal quotation marks omitted). If these elements were applied to Heck's § 1983 claim, he
would have to show that the police did not have probable cause to arrest and charge him and
that they were motivated by malice in doing so. However, under the common law of 1871, a
criminal conviction would create an "irrebuttable" presumption "that the prosecution never
lacked probable cause." l at 496. This would mean, as a matter of logic, "that conviction of a
crime wipes out a person's § 1983 claim for damages," ia. at 496, even if that individual were
able to comply with the favorable-termination requirement imposed under Heck. Justice Souter
also noted that Heck's action for damages resembled a claim for abuse of process as well as for
malicious prosecution, and thus that if "the common law were the master of statutory analysis..
we would find ourselves with two masters to contend with." l at 494.
"' See id. at 499-500 ("It may be that the Court's analysis takes it no further than I would
thus go, and that any objection I may have to the Court's opinion is to style, not substance.").
112 See id. at 500 ("[A]fter enactment of the habeas statute and because of it, prison inmates seeking § 1983 damages in federal court for unconstitutional conviction or confinement
must satisfy a requirement analogous to the malicious-prosecution tort's favorable-termination
requirement.").
113Justice Souter explained:
Harmonizing § 1983 and the habeas statute by requiring a state prisoner seeking
damages for unconstitutional conviction to establish the previous invalidation of his
conviction does not run afoul of what we have called, repeatedly, "[tihe very purpose of' § 1983: "to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people's federal rights."
lMLat 501 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
14 See id. ("A prisoner caught at the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute can still
have his attack on the lawfulness of his conviction or confinement heard in federal court...
and .... he may be able to obtain § 1983 damages.").
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place at risk the rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and
the habeas statute, individuals not 'in custody' for habeas purposes."' 5 If Heck were applied to individuals without access to a
federal court sitting in habeas, such individuals would be denied "any
federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights" if they
could not "first obtain a favorable state ruling."'1 6 Justice Souter argued that such a result would be contrary to the purpose of § 1983,
providing a federal forum for those claiming an official violation of
federally protected rights:
It would be an entirely different matter.., to shut off
federal courts altogether to claims that fall within the plain
language of § 1983. "[I]rrespective of the common law support" for a general rule disfavoring collateral attacks, the
Court lacks the authority to do any such thing absent unambiguous congressional direction where, as here, reading §
1983 to exclude claims from federal court would run counter
' 17
to "§ 1983's history" and defeat the statute's "purpose."
In Justice Souter's view, then, "the plain language of § 1983"
mandates access to the federal courts for those claiming that their federally protected rights have been violated under color of state law,
irrespective of any common-law doctrine "disfavoring collateral attacks." Importantly, Justice Souter's position is clearly based on a
broad reading of Congress's purpose in enacting § 1983, namely, "'to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights."'" 18 Given the purpose and
the broad language of the statute, Justice Souter argued that old common-law doctrines or principles, by themselves, could not empower
the Court to limit the reach of § 1983.119 Justice Souter then emphasized the breadth of § 1983's language, pointing out that the statute
"speaks of deprivations of 'any' constitutional rights ... by '[e]very'
person acting under color of state law,"' 120 and which, the Court has
held, "'provide[s] a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms
of official violation of federally protected rights."121

15

Id. at 500. Justice Souter provided the following list of such individuals: "people who

were merely fined,... or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences .
I..."
ld.
116

Id.

Id. at 501 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 158 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
119 See id. at 502. Justice Souter's exact words: "[S]urely the common law can give us no
authority to narrow the 'broad language' of § 1983." Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 445 (1991)).
117
11
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On the question of § 1983 challenges to state convictions in the
federal courts, then, Justice Souter drew a clear line in Heck between
those in custody, who have access to the federal courts using habeas
corpus,
not
122 and those
.
. in custody, who would only have access using §
1983.
This distinction between those limited, under the PreiserHeck line of cases, to habeas corpus as their exclusive federal remedy
and those with access to the federal courts under § 1983 reflects the
differences between federal interference with custodial and noncustodial convictions. The habeas statute, with its "explicit policy of
exhaustion," 1 3 recognizes one set of policy concerns, § 1983 a different set of concerns. Justice Souter suggested that a § 1983 action for
damages in federal court is "a significantly less disruptive remedy
than an order compelling release from custody." 124 In other words,
habeas corpus relief affects state functions in ways that raise more
serious federalism concerns than § 1983 challenges to state convictions by individuals not in custody. The Court's holding in Preiser
was largely based on the important interest of the states in administering their prisons.1l 5 A federal court order compelling the release of
a prisoner from state custody is a substantial intervention in the state's
functions. In requiring exhaustion of state remedies in the habeas
corpus statute, Congress explicitly recognized states' interests and
thus limited federal review of state convictions under habeas corpus.
But, in Justice Souter's view, federal courts can also review a state
126
conviction when the plaintiff is "unaffected by the habeas statute"
and thus comes under the broad scope of § 1983. In this interpretation, neither federalism concerns nor Scalia's "hoary principle" disfavoring collateral attacks can override the congressional policy underlying § 1983.
Justice Souter was unable to muster a majority of the Court,
however, and thus Heck does not draw a distinction between those in
custody and those not in custody. In a footnote to the opinion of the
Court, Justice Scalia rejected Justice Souter's argument in the following terms: "We think the principle barring collateral attacks-a
longstanding and deeply rooted feature of both the common law and
our own jurisprudence-is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity
that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated." 27 Heck's favorable-termination requirement, then, would apply both to state prison122 See id. at 503 ("I would not cast doubt on the ability of an individual unaffected by the
habeas statute to take advantage of the broad reach of § 1983.").
'2 id. at503.
'2 ld. at 502.
12 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1978) ('It is difficult to imagine an
activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with
state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.").
'2 Heck, 512 U.S. at 503 (Souter, J., concurring).
127 Id. at490n.10.
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ers in custody and those no longer (or never) in custody. 128 The fact
that the latter group does not have access to a federal forum through
habeas corpus-and thus may not have access to a federal forum at
all-is largely irrelevant under Heck.129 The reason for this is that
Heck interprets habeas corpus as a limited exception to general common-law principle disfavoring collateral attack. Without the explicit
authorization of the habeas corpus statute, Heck does not permit
challenges to the validity of state convictions in federal court.
D. Spencer v. Kemna
In a more recent case, Spencer v. Kemna, 13° a majority of the
current Court adopted Justice Souter's position on allowing § 1983
challenges to state convictions. Justice Souter did not write the
opinion of the Court, however, and thus the legal effect of this unorthodox majority is unclear. 131 Spencer involved a habeas petition that
had been dismissed for mootness by the district court. 132 Spencer, the
habeas petitioner, was released on parole, but his parole was subsequently revoked and he was re-incarcerated. While in prison, he filed
a habeas petition challenging the revocation of his parole. Before the
district court reached the merits of his petition, however, Spencer's
sentence expired and he was released.! 3 The Supreme Court held
that, because a revocation of parole rarely has any collateral consequences by itself, Spencer's habeas application had been rendered
moot by the expiration of his term and his inability to show any continuing injuries as a result of the revocation of his parole.134
128 See, e.g., Anderson v. County of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 494,499 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The
fact that a plaintiff is no longer incarcerated has no bearing on the applicability of Heck."),
overruledby DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081,
1086 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Heck applies as much to prisoners in custody (a habeas prerequisite) as to
persons no longer incarecerated."); White v. Phillips, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (W.D. La.
1998) ("If the favorable termination requirement is an element of the prima facie case ... as
Justice Scalia's common law analysis would have it, then the status of the petitioner, whether
free or detained, matters not at all.").
'29 See Anderson, 111 F.3d at 499 ("That it may be difficult (perhaps in some casesmostly due to a lapse of time-even impossible) to get a conviction reversed or expunged does
not constitute a reason for bypassing the holding in Heck.").
'30 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
131 Justice Souter concurred in Spencer. Three other Justices signed on to this concurrence-Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer-making four votes for his position on this
issue. Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurrence, in which she explained the reasons for the
change in her position between Heck and Spencer on this issue. See id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with Justice Souter's reasoning that § 1983 applies to those not in custody). The fifth Justice for Justice Souter's "majority" was Justice Stevens, who actually dissented from the Court's holding in Spencer. See id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given
the Court's holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as [Justice Souter] explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
132 See id. at 3-6 (describing the factual and procedural history of the case).
133

See id.

See id. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring) ("But mootness, however it may have come about,
simply deprives us of our power to act ....
").
134
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Justice Souter wrote separately to provide an added reason for
the Court's holding in Spencer.135 One of Spencer's arguments was
that he would be deprived of a federal forum for demonstrating the
illegality of his parole revocation if iis habeas petition was declared
moot because, under Heck, a person not in custody has no access to
the federal courts. 136 In short, Spencer argued that he would be unable to satisfy the favorable-termination of Heck if his habeas petition
were declared moot. Justice Souter argued in response: "Heck did not
hold that a released prisoner in Spencer's circumstances is out of
court on a § 1983 claim .... For all that appears here, then, Spencer
is free to bring a § 1983 action, and his corresponding
argument for
' 37
continuing habeas standing falls accordingly.'
After explaining his reasons for concurring in the Spencer judgment, Justice Souter restated the position he had expressed in Heck on
the relationship between the habeas statute and § 1983. Although
Heck was "a simple way to avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and § 1983, ' ' 38 Justice Souter argued that the federal courts are
"bound to recognize the apparent scope of § 1983 when no limitation
[is] required for the sake of honoring some other statute or weighty
policy, as in the instance of habeas., 13 9 Thus, a prisoner no longer in
custody, like Spencer, or an individual who was never in custody for
purposes of the habeas statute, should have access to the federal
courts through a § 1983 action. 4 Or, as Justice Ginsburg stated succinctly in her concurrence: "Individuals without recourse to the habeas statute because
they are not 'in custody' ... fit within § 1983's
' 141
'broad reach.'
Justice Souter's concurrences in Heck and Spencer, then, would
permit § 1983 actions challenging state convictions in federal court as
long as the person bringing the action is not currently in custody and
thus required to pursue habeas corpus as his or her exclusive federal
remedy. Given that a majority of the current Court has expressed
135 See id. ("I join the Court's opinion as well as the judgment, though I do so for an added
reason that the Court does not reach, but which I spoke to while concurring in a prior case.").
136 See id. at 19 (describing Spencer's argument that, under Heck, "holding his habeas
claim moot would leave him without any present access to a federal forum to show the unconstitutionality of his parole revocation").
137Id. However, Justice Souter also adds that "[t]o be sure, the majority opinion in Heck
can be read" in such a way as to require favorable termination of habeas proceedings before
allowing Spencer to continue: "['lhe [Heck] majority acknowledged the possibility that even a
released prisoner might not be permitted to bring a § 1983 action implying the invalidity of a
conviction or confinement without first satisfying the favorable-termination requirement." Id. at
19-20. Apparently, on this issue Justice Souter would have limited the holding in Heck to the
facts presented. See id. at 19 ("Heck did not present such facts ... .
"s Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Id.

140 See id. at 21 n.* ("The convict given a fine alone, however onerous, ... would always
be ineligible for § 1983 relief [under the alternative view].").
141Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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their agreement with this position, most of the federal courts that have
addressed this issue since Spencer have held that an individual for
whom habeas corpus relief is unavailable can bring a § 1983 action in
federal court to challenge a state conviction. 142 One federal court has
even read Justice Souter's position to mean "that some federal remedy-either habeas corpus or § 1983-must be available."' 43
Parts I through V of this Note further develop the argument for
Justice Souter's position in Heck and Spencer. Part Id argues that
Justice Souter's position assumes a lack of parity between state and
federal courts as defenders of federal rights. Justice Souter appears to
take the position that a federal forum is preferable to a state forum
where federal rights are concerned, and thus he can be understood as
siding with a long line of case law and commentary on this important
question. Part III argues that Justice Souter's position on this issue is
well-supported by the empirical evidence on parity as well as historical, constitutional, and statutory considerations. Accepting this
premise-that access to a federal forum is necessary for the protection of federal rights-requires the reconsideration of the preclusive
effects of a prior state judgment, discussed in Part IV. Under the current law, individuals using § 1983 to challenge a state criminal conviction in federal court generally cannot relitigate issues decided
against them in state court. If the Court is serious about providing
access to a federal forum in such cases, however, it cannot grant such
a sweeping preclusive effect to state-court judgments. Finally, Part V
argues that concerns of judicial economy and finality do not outweigh
the necessity of a federal forum. The fear of a flood of § 1983 actions
is based on a flawed analogy to the large numbers of habeas petitions
filed in the federal courts. Similarly, state governments have much
less significant finality interests in cases involving non-custodial convictions than in convictions resulting in custody. In the final analysis,
such concerns do not outweigh the important legislative purpose of §
1983, providing a federal forum for the protection of federal rights.

See, e.g., Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999) ("A majority of the
Justices of the Supreme Court have said that a prisoner who cannot challenge the validity of his
conviction... by either appeal or postconviction procedure can do so by bringing a civil rights
suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); White v. Phillips, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1038 (W.D.
La. 1998) ("In light of the Supreme Court's disposition in the recent case of Spencer v. Kemna,.
.. Heck... does not bar White's petition, and he may proceed with his case."); Zupan v. Brown,
5 F. Supp. 2d 792,797 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("The Court is persuaded by Justice Souter's reasoning
in Spencer and Heck. It is unfair to require a person who is legally precluded from challenging
his or her conviction or sentence on habeas grounds to demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been overturned or invalidated."). But cf. Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1998) (rejecting the idea that dicta can overturn a clear precedent).
143 Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999).
142
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I. PARITY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Justice Souter criticized the rule announced in Heck because it
"would needlessly place at risk the rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals not 'in custody'
for habeas purposes." 144 To apply Heck to these individuals would
deny them "any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal
rights." 145 Justice Souter argues instead that the purpose of § 1983 is
to provide a federal forum for claimed deprivations of federal rights:
It would be an entirely different matter... to shut off federal
courts altogether to claims that fall within the plain language
of § 1983. "[I]rrespective of the common law support" for a
general rule disfavoring collateral attacks, the Court lacks the
authority to do any such thing absent unambiguous congressional direction where, as here, reading § 1983 to exclude
claims from federal court would run counter
146 to "§ 1983's
history" and defeat the statute's "purpose."'
Importantly, Justice Souter's argument is premised on a broad
reading of the purpose of § 1983--"'to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."' ' 47 In other words, Justice Souter argues that the role of
the federal courts under § 1983 is to guard the people of the states
against violations of their federally protected rights by the state governments themselves. In arguing that a federal forum is necessary to
protect federal rights, Justice Souter implicitly calls into question the
fitness of the state courts as guardians of those rights. If Justice
Souter started from the premise that the state courts would adequately
protect the federal rights of state criminal defendants, then it would
make little sense for him to write separately to insist on access to a
federal forum merely to confirm the conclusions of the state courts.
The first question that must be addressed, then, is the relative fitness of state courts for this important task. If state courts are inferior
to federal courts in protecting federal rights, then it makes sense to
argue that § 1983 should be interpreted expansively to provide individuals claiming official deprivation of those rights access to a federal
forum. If, however, there is no significant difference between the
state and federal courts in their ability or willingness to protect federal
rights, then access to a federal forum is not essential or even desirable, given concerns of federal-state comity and judicial economy.
'44 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). For a list of
such individuals, see supranote 115.
145 id.
146

Id. at 501 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 158 (1992)).

147 Id. (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
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There has been a long debate in the scholarly literature on
whether there is parity between state and federal courts in protecting
federal rights.148 Commentators have long noted the inconsistent nature of the Court's discussions of parity. 149 In many cases, the Court
has emphasized "the importance of federal tribunals as the primary
guardians of federal rights."' 50 But there is "an equally long, equally
well respected list of cases maintaining the contradictory position:
state courts have the same responsibility toward federal claims that
federal courts have and state courts cannot be presumed to do a less
competent job."'' 1 When the Court has adopted the view that there is
parity between state and federal courts, it has at the same time rejected the necessity of a federal forum, holding that state courts adequately protect federal rights. 152 In doing so, the Court has often
stressed other values, especially federal-state comity. 153 The role of
comity in this debate, however, cannot be separated from the issue of
parity. 154 The reason for this is straightforward: if there is not parity
between federal and state courts, then the federal courts' responsibil-

ity to enforce constitutional protections must outweigh concerns

about comity. 55 One will be concerned with comity, or conclude that
comity outweighs the necessity of a federal forum, then, only if one
already believes that there is parity between the state and federal
courts.

148 See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (2d. ed. 1990) (examining the struggle among courts in the
federal system); Paul H. Bator, The State Courtsand FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) (analyzing the role of state courts in federal constitutional law);
Erwin Chemerinsky, ParityReconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,36 UCLA
L. REV. 233 (1988) (arguing that litigants be allowed to choose their forum for constitutional
claims); Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of FederalJurisdiction,22 WM. & MARY L
REV. 683 (1981) (describing areas of complexity in federal jurisdictional issues); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity,90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (comparing state and federal courts to
demonstrate the preference for federal courts in constitutional matters); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on FederalJurisdictionand
ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988) (agreeing with Chemerinsky's conclusion,
but criticizing his analysis); Michal E. Solimine & James L. Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in
Federaland State Courts, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 213 (1983) (discussing the results of a
study supporting the existence of parity).
149 See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 246 ("Vhat is most striking about the Supreme
Court's statements about parity is their inconsistency. There are as many declarations that state
courts are equal to federal courts as there are statements that federal courts are superior to state
courts in protecting federal rights."); Field, supra note 148, at 688 (noting the "peculiar schizophrenia in the case discussions of the policies favoring state or federal forums").
15oField, supranote 148, at 684.
151 Id. at 685-86.
152 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
153 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
154 See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 288 (arguing that "comity cannot operate as a
principle... independent of parity").
15s See id. ("If there is not parity, then federal jurisdiction is justified regardless of the
insult or friction.").
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A. Arguments Against Parity
In Heck and Spencer, Justice Souter's argument falls within the
"lack of parity" line of cases. Although the Supreme Court has not
consistently adhered to this position, it has been the dominant position
in the scholarly literature on the subject. Many arguments have been
advanced against the parity of state and federal courts, including the
relative technical expertise of state and federal judges, the judicial
independence of federal judges, historical experience with state
courts, and the political motivations of those seeking to limit access to
a federal forum.
The first argument against parity is that federal judges are more
competent to deal with such cases than state judges because of both
the relative capacities of the judges themselves and various institutional characteristics of the federal courts. 56 By comparison to the
number of state judges, the federal bench is relatively small and
drawn from an elite pool of candidates. 5 7 In addition, the more exclusive nature of the federal bench increases its prestige and thus, all
else being equal, the quality of those appointed to it. 58 Other factors
weighing against parity include the greater compensation provided for
federal judges, the relatively lighter caseload of the federal courts,
and the higher quality of federal law clerks. 159 In sum, federal courts
are to be preferred to state courts because federal judges will have, on
average, more knowledge about federal issues, more expertise in
dealing with them, 16 and more time and support in carefully considering them.
In addition, the technical competence of federal judges is also
related to the manner of their selection, which is more likely to focus
on the professional competence of the appointee than the selection
processes for state judges. 16' As one scholar has argued, "because of
l56 See Neubome, supranote 148, at 1121.
157See id. ("Because it is relatively small, the federal trial bench maintains a level of competence in its pool of potential appointees which dwarfs the competence of the vastly larger pool

from which state trial judges are selected.").
'5
See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 276 ('The smaller number of federal judges enhances the prestige of serving on that bench and thus attracts the most qualified individuals to
federal judgeships").
"S See id.at 276-77 (analyzing the relationship between the quality of judges and institutional factors); Neubome, supra note 148, at 1121-22 (citing the quality of federal law clerks
and the lighter caseload of federal judges as contributing to the competency of federal judges).
160 See REDISH, supranote 148, at 2 ("[F]ederal courts have developed a vast expertise in
dealing with the intricacies of federal law.").
161 See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 276 ('The federal selection process, which generally includes bar association review, evaluation by Senators, and scrutiny by the incumbent
administration, is thought to yield more uniformly qualified judges than the state processes.");
Neubome, supra note 148, at 1122 ("'While the federal selection process is not without flaws, it
does focus substantially on the professional competence of the nominee."). But cf.Solimine &
Walker, supranote 148, at 228 (making the point that "the selection process for federal judges
has always been, and continues to be 'political' in nature").
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the process of presidential selection and Senate confirmation, we can
usually be assured of a floor of competence in the federal judiciary.''t62 The implication is that such a "floor of competence" is
missing in some state courts. Some commentators have even argued
that the selection processes for state judges, which generally involve
judicial elections at some point, may actually deter qualified candidates from seeking judicial appointments: "[A]ny electoral process
will discourage a very large number of well qualified persons from
seeking judicial office."1 63 Given the weight of these considerations,
even those scholars opposed to providing a federal forum in many
cases, 164 or who argue that the lack of parity does not necessarily
translate into different case outcomes, 165 have generally conceded that
1 66
federal judges are of higher quality, on average, than state judges.
The higher quality of the federal bench counsels in favor of granting
individuals access to a federal forum for the adjudication of their federal rights.
The judicial independence of the federal judiciary is a second
reason for the superiority of federal judges to state judges. 167 Federal
judges serve during good behavior, 68 and thus enjoy significant insulation from majoritarian pressures. 69 State judges, on the other
hand, are subject to greater majoritarian pressures because they must
generally seek re-election. Because enforcing the federally protected
rights of individuals who have been convicted of state crimes will
typically be politically unpopular, the responsibility for protecting

162

REDISH, supra note 148, at 2.
A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 46 (1985); see also

163 RICHARD

Chemerinsky, supranote 148, at 276 ("[T]he existence in almost all states of electoral selection
or review of judges. is thought to deter some highly qualified individuals who do not want to
particiate in such a political process.").
See Bator, supra note 148, at 608 (conceding that "once it is established that the federal
courts may, on balance, do a better job, the argument that a plaintiff should be free to choose the
federal forum seems especially powerful").
165 See Solimine & Walker, supra note 148, at 228 (conceding that "the quality of federal
judges ...is clearly higher").
166 In an attempt to avoid this problem, Professors Solimine and Walker argue that the
proper comparison is not between individual federal and state judges, but "between federal
judges and the entire state court system, including appellate courts." Id. at 226. See also Bator,
supra note 148, at 630 (arguing, similar to Solimine & Walker, that the relevant comparison is
"between the federal courts and the entire hierarchy of state courts, including the highest state
appellate courts").
167 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 148, at 2 ("[B]ecause federal judges are guaranteed the
independence protections of Article Il1, while many state judges are forced to stand for election,
we can generally be assured of a greater degree of independence of the federal judiciary from
external political forces."); Neuborne, supra note 148, at 1127-28 (arguing that federal judges
serving during good behavior are "as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally
possible," while state judges elected for a fixed term are more vulnerable to such pressures).
16 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("The Judges . . .shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour.").
169 This argument dates back to THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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such rights should be placed in judges less subject to majoritarian
pressures.
A third argument against parity is that state courts have historically failed to protect federal rights, most notably during Reconstruction in the nineteenth century and the civil-rights era in the twentieth. 170 This historical argument assumes, to some extent, that the
state courts' past failures to protect federal rights are evidence of a
continuing inadequacy in that regard, an assumption that some scholars have questioned. 17' There is empirical evidence, however, that
state courts have not complied with Supreme Court precedents regarding important federal rights in recent decades. One of the leading
works on the impact of Supreme Court decisions, for example, concludes that the due process revolution of the 1960s was "The Revolution That Wasn't.",112 The Warren Court was unable to achieve its
goals in this area "because political support was often lacking and
seldom were the conditions necessary for change present. What was
overlooked was that organizations, be they prison systems, police departments, or lower courts, are often unwilling to change." 7 There
are reasons to think, then, that the lessons of history on the inadequacy
of state courts in protecting federal rights are still relevant to17 4
day.
Finally, it could be argued that the effort of conservatives in recent decades to shift the adjudication of controversial issues from
federal courts to the state courts provides some evidence that state
courts are less sympathetic fora for the protection of federal rights, at
least if one accepts the broad definition of those rights established by
the Supreme Court in the last forty years. 75 Professor Neuborne
compares contemporary arguments claiming that parity exists to the
pretextual "outcome-neutral" arguments used in the past to justify

170

See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 243 ("[S]tate resistance to civil rights, especially

in the South, renewed distrust of the state courts.").
171 See Solimine & Walker, supra note 148, at 225 ("In short, it can be argued that whatever the historical scorecard of state courts in enforcing federal rights, such a record has only
tangential relevance to the modem debate over parity.").
1n GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 334 (1991).
173

id.
174 See Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,

1137 (1977) [hereinafter Developments] ("[Miany of the concerns which prompted the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 have contemporary analogues... !').
175 For a discussion of the effect of the expansion of federally protected rights in the postwar era, see Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 242-43. Professor Chemerinsky points to the
effects of both "the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the incorporation process," which "greatly expanded the opportunity for state violations of constitutional liberties,"
and "the Supreme Court's expansion of individual liberties," which "created more opportunities
for claims that states had violated constitutional rights," as reasons for the increased importance
of the issue of parity since the 1950s. Id.
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outcome-determining forum allocations. 176 He argues that, in more
recent decades, "[l]awyers seeking to enforce the Bill of Rights
against the states have sought to use the lower federal courts as the
primary implementing forum," while lawyers representing local and
state overnments have attempted to litigate such matters in state
court.
Similarly, some conservative members of Congress have
sought to reverse controversial Supreme Court precedents by depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction over those issues, assuming that
the state courts will be a more friendly forum for the outcomes they
prefer. 78 In short, lack of parity appears to be the working assumption of a number of legal and political actors. To the extent that this
working assumption is supported by experience, it weighs heavily
against the conclusion that there is parity between state and federal
courts in protecting federal rights.
Overall, the weight of the evidence points toward a lack of parity
between state and federal courts in terms of their ability and willingness to protect federal rights from violation. From this conclusion, it
is only a small step to argue, as Justice Souter does in his Heck and
Spencer concurrences, that § 1983 challenges to state convictions in
federal court should be permitted: individuals claiming a violation of
their federal rights should have access to a federal forum because that
forum will be more likely to protect their rights than the state forum.
In this way, Justice Souter's broad reading of § 1983 provides added
protection for individual rights by making available a federal remedy
for their violation by state officials.
The greater protection afforded to federal rights in federal courts,
however, may be the result, in large part, of historical contingencies
rather than actual characteristics of federal courts or judges. As
Chemerinsky has pointed out, "there is no reason that better judges
are necessarily more disposed toward safeguarding individual liberties.', 179 The "psychological set'1 80 or ideological dispositions of federal judges, toward their role as guardians of federal rights changes
over time. There may be times in history when federal courts may
176
177

See Neubome, supra note 148, at 1106-08.
Id. at 1108. In this context, Professor Neubome was drawing on his personal experi-

ence as a practicing civil-liberties lawyer. In this capacity, he assumed that "persons advancing
federal constitutional claims against local officials will fare better, as a rule, in a federal, rather
than a state, trial court." Id. at 1115-1116.
78 See Lawrence H. Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning Disfavored Rights Out
of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 129-31 (1981) (discussing congressional efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts in an effort to affect case outcomes); Michael Wells, Behind the ParityDebate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition
in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 617 (1991) ("[E]ach [side in the parity
debate] pursues the litigating edge it can obtain by having the issues heard in a forum sympathetic to its ends.").
179 Chemerinsky, supranote 148, at 278.
180 This term is used by Neubome, supranote 148, at 1124-26.
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not actually protect federal rights any better than their state counterparts, and it may be possible that in some historical contexts, state
courts may be more protective than federal courts. 181 This suggests
that the parity (or lack thereof) of the state and federal courts at any
given point in time cannot be dispositive, despite the attention scholars have paid to it.' 82 The next subsection presents an argument for
the superiority of federal courts in protecting federal rights that is not
dependent on an empirical assessment of the parity of the state and
federal courts.
B. Does the Court'sAssessment of ParityMatter?
Alternatively, it can be argued that concerns about the parity of
state and federal courts are irrelevant for determining whether a federal forum should be available for the adjudication of federal rights.
On this view, what matters is the theory of parity embodied in the
Constitution and federal law; the Court's assessment of parity would
then have to give way to the determination of the Constitution or
Congress (or both). If the Constitution or Congress has determined
that state courts are equally suited to the adjudication of federal
rights, then the courts should not override that assessment with their
own determination of the issue.
Justice Scalia has argued that "the theory ... that a federal forum
must be afforded for every federal claim of a state criminal defen1 84
dant"' 83 "misperceives the basic structure of our national system." '
Justice Scalia's argument is premised in part on his interpretation of
the Madisonian Compromise, which left the creation of lower federal
courts to Congress's discretion.185 By not creating lower federal
151

See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 274 (pointing to "changes in the composition of

the federal judiciary" in the 1980s as a reason to expect the federal bench to be less sympathetic
to claims that federally protected rights have been violated). Even earlier, however, changes in
Supreme Court membership led to decisions making access to federal fora more difficult, and
these decisions prompted some jurists to suggest that civil libertarians might turn to state courts
and even state constitutions for the protection of civil liberties. See William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977)
("Mhe very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state
courts to step into the breach."); Hans A. Linde, FirstThings First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 261, 263 (David M. O'Brien
ed., 1997) (arguing that "a state court.., put things in their logical sequence and... examine its
state law first, before reaching a federal issue").
182 To a great extent, this is the conclusion that the scholarly debate has reached in recent
years. In 1991, leading scholars on parity participated in a symposium on the issue, and the
general conclusion was that "[n]ow is the time to lay the parity debate to rest." Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the ParityDebate, 71 B.U. L REV. 593, 593 (1991). As an alternative, Professor
Chemerinsky suggested that the parity of the state and federal courts was a "question[] for Congress" rather than the courts to decide. lId at 601. This argument is addressed infra Part i.B.
183 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 721 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I8 id. at 722-23.
185 Professor Farrand summarizes the Madisonian Compromise in the following terms:
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courts, the Constitution implies that the state courts are proper fora
for the adjudication of federal rights; according to Justice Scalia: "It
would be a strange constitution that regards state courts as secondrate instruments for the vindication of federal rights and yet makes no
mandatory provision for lower federal courts (as our Constitution
does not).'6 In other words, parity is constitutionally mandated: the
Constitution posits that state courts are not "second-rate instruments"
for the protection of federal rights, and thus it is erroneous to extend a
federal forum to187an individual who has access to an equally competent state forum.
Justice Scalia's assessment of the Constitution's view of parity,
however, fails to take into account the "vast tranformation [of] the
concepts of federalism" following the Civil War. 8 ' Although it is
true that "[i]n the early days of the Republic, federalism was viewed
as a means of protecting individual rights from the tyranny of a unified central government,"' 8 9 events following the Civil War revealed
that state courts were unwilling to protect the federal rights of freedmen and their white supporters.' 9° Thus, the transformation of
That there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all.... The difficulty lay in the fact that they were regarded as an encroachment upon the rights of
the individual states. It was claimed that the state courts were perfectly competent
for the work required, and that it would be quite sufficient to grant an appeal from
them to the national supreme court. The decision that was reached was characteristic of much of the later work ....
[The matter was compromised: inferior courts
were not required, but the national legislature was permitted to establish them.
MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTMTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79-80 (1913).
186
187

Withrow, 507 U.S. at 723.
But cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment: Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L

REv. 645, 646 (1991) ("The Constitution itself ... presumes... disparity between federal and
state courts-at least where the question is which court may be given the last word on issues of
federal law."). Professor Amar also notes that the Constitution vests the judicial power in a
federal judiciary, which does not appear to include state courts. Id. at 649. See U.S. CoNsr. art.
H, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
188 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
1s9 Developments, supranote 174, at 1135.
190 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe, the Court stated:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the [1871 act] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. There can be little doubt that "the state agencies" in question included the state courts. One
supporter of the 1871 act was quoted in Monroe to the effect that
[l]t is a fact ... that of the hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people
through the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one has been punished. This
defect in the administration of the laws does not extend to other cases. Vigorously
enough are the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail in efficiency
when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid. Then
Justice closes the door of her temples.
Id. at 178 (quotation marks omitted).
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American law and federalism occurring after the Civil War amounts
to a second understanding of parity, one found in both the Constitution, in the form of the post-Civil War amendments, 191 and in federal
statutes, including § 1983.192 This transformation was summarized in
Mitchum v. Foster "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional
action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial.""' 193 This statement of legislative purpose in
enacting § 1983 is often cited in opinions defending the necessity of a
federal forum. 9 4 In sum, what Justice Scalia misunderstands about
the basic structure of our national system is that the Constitution of
the late-eighteenth century was radically transformed in the 1860s and
1870s, and that the Reconstruction Congresses effected this transformation by using their constitutional powers to create and extend federal-court jurisdiction in order to protect federal
195 rights, even against
violation by the state governments themselves.
Not surprisingly, Justice Souter advances this theory of § 1983's
legislative purpose in his Heck concurrence. 196 Justice Souter argues
in Heck that the Court should not use the common law to thwart Congress's purpose in enacting § 1983. After pointing to the legislative
intent behind § 1983, Justice Souter argues that there must either be a

191 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 82 (1991) (arguing
that the post-Civil War amendments were a "quantum leap... in nationalizing the protection of
individual rights").
'9 Dissenting in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 513-514 (1973), Justice Brennan
argued:
By enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, and again by the grant in
1875 of original federal-question jurisdiction to the federal courts, Congress recognized important interests in permitting a plaintiff to choose a federal forum in cases
arising under federal law. "In thus expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a
suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because
state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, '...
to guard, enforce and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of
the United States .... "
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248
(1967)).
'9' 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972) (quoting ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339,346 (1879)).
194See, e.g., Preiser,411 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
19- See Developments, supra note 174, at 1142 ("Mhe lower federal courts emerged from
the Reconstruction period with significantly greater importance, supplanting the state courts as
the principal forum for enforcing federal law.").
96 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 501 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that
"'the very purpose of' § 1983 [is] 'to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights"') (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242).
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statute limiting the reach of § 1983197 or a "policy reflected in a congressional enactment that would justify" denying an individual access
to a federal forum. 198 Unable to find any statute or underlying congressional policy that would deny a federal forum to individuals
claiming official violations of their federal rights, Justice Souter concludes that the Court cannot deny such access based on its own understanding of the common law:
[A]bsent such a statutory policy, surely the common law can
give us no authority to narrow the "broad language" of §
1983, which speaks of deprivations of "any" constitutional
rights, privileges, or immunities, by "[e]very" person acting
under color of state law, and to which "we have given full effect [by] recognizing that § 1983 'provides a remedy, to be
broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of
federally protected rights. '199
Justice Souter's position is relatively straightforward. Congress has
determined that, when it comes to protecting federal rights, federal
courts are superior to state courts, and the Court should not override
Congress's determination that access to a federal forum is therefore
necessary to vindicate federal rights.
Subsequently, Justice Souter repeated this argument in Spencer
2
v. Kemna, and a majority of the Court apparently agreed with him. 00
This is significant because it may signal that the Court is changing
direction on the issue of the necessity of a federal forum to protect
federal rights. Over the past few decades, the Court has significantly
narrowed access to federal fora when challenges to state functions
have been at issue. This has been true in habeas corpus cases, in
cases involving other federal laws and constitutional provisions, and
in other § 1983 cases. 20 1 In all these areas, federalism concerns'97 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 502 (arguing that such "a result [would be] unjustified by the
habeas statute or any other post-§ 1983 enactment."). This was essentially the argument of
Preiser. See supranotes 72-82 and accompanying text.
'9' Heck, 512 U.S. at502.
199Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439,443, 445 (1991)).
200 See supranotes 130-41 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (involving Fair Labor Standards Act
allegations brought by state probation officers); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 119 (1999) (involving Lanham Act claim against
state-administered tuition pre-payment program); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that a criminal defendant's inability to obtain federal habeus review of his Fourth Amendment claim did not render the collateral estoppel doctrine inapplicable to his § 1983 suit); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) ("[WJhere the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state
prisoner be granted federal habeus corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53-54 (1971) (holding that a federal court cannot enjoin a state prosecutor's enforcement of a
state statute solely on the basis of the possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its face).
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comity between the federal and state courts, respect for state functions, or the residual sovereignty maintained by the states under the
Constitution-have trumped other concerns, including, in many
cases, providing a federal forum for the adjudication of federally
protected rights. Justice Souter's argument for a federal forum for
individuals who have no access to habeas review implicitly rejects the
parity of state and federal courts as fora for the protection of federal
rights. Whether this position is based on an empirical assessment of
the state and federal courts, or on an historical understanding of Congress's purposes in passing § 1983, it indicates that Justice Souter and
other members of the current Court are rethinking an issue long
thought settled in the law of federal courts-the assumption of parity
between the state and federal courts. If this assumption, which forms
the basis for a number of important legal doctrines, is reconsidered
and rejected, then a number
of related doctrines must be reconsidered
20 2
and rejected, as well.
IV.

ISSUE PRECLUSION

One of the most important of these related doctrines is the application of issue preclusion to § 1983 cases.20 3 Under the holding in
Allen v. McCurry,204 a § 1983 plaintiff in federal court seeking to
relitigate an issue already decided in a state criminal trial will be precluded by the state court's holding on that issue. Thus, Allen blocks
such § 1983 actions as surely as would Heck's favorable-termination
requirement. In one sense, the Allen and Heck rules cover much the
same ground, because, under Heck, a § 1983 plaintiff must first secure a favorable termination in another forum, most likely a favorable
state ruling. In both Allen and Heck, then, the Court deferred to state
courts, assuming that they would adequately protect the federal rights
of potential § 1983 plaintiffs. But if Heck should not apply to those
without access to habeas corpus, as Justice Souter argues, then Allen's
issue preclusion rule should not apply either, as it would have much
m At this point, it is unclear whether the fact that a majority of the current Court has determined that a federal forum is necessary under § 1983 in cases such as those discussed here
points toward a change of direction on federalism issues or whether Spencer is an anomaly.
2
In fact, one Justice suggested, in dissent, that § 1983 challenges to state convictions
would depend on the Court's treatment of the res judicata or issue preclusion issue:
The Court has never expressly decided whether and in what circumstances § 1983
can be invoked to attack collaterally state criminal convictions. The resolution of
this generalproblem depends on the extent to which, in a § 1983 action, principles
of res judicata bar relitigation in federal court of constitutional issues decided in
statejudicialproceedingsto which thefederalplaintiff was a party.
Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426,440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Before the Court decided Allen, a scholarly literature on the propriety of applying res judicata principles to § 1983 cases had developed. See, e.g., William H.
Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U. L.
REv. 859 (1976) (arguing that res judicata should not be applied in § 1983 cases).
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the same effect. Allen's application of issue preclusion in such cases
must be rejected if the Court accepts the premise that access to federal
court is necessary to protect federal rights.
The Allen Court explicitly rejected the "generally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district
court." 20 5 The Court based this rejection, in large part, on its interpretation of § 1983: "[N]othing in the language or legislative history
of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a
state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its
proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to
litigate federal claims."' 06 The Court concluded that the idea that a
federal forum is necessary was "hardly a legal basis at all, but rather
[based in] a general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues." 20 7 The Court rejected
this premise, pointing to its recent decisions expressing confidence in
the parity of state courts as fora for the protection of federal rights. 0 8
The Court also noted in Allen that federal-state preclusion "promote[s] the comity between state and federal courts," 2°9 further evidence that the decision was firmly based in the assumption of parity
between state and federal courts.
The Allen Court's analysis, however, is flawed by its anachronistic reading of the legislative intent behind § 1983. These flaws
stem from the Allen Court's view that § 1983 conflicts with the Full
Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal courts to give the same
preclusive effect to state judgments as would the courts of the state in
question. 210 Under this view, a broad reading of § 1983, allowing
relitigation in federal court of issues already decided in state court,
would partially repeal the Full Faith and Credit Act. 21 ' Citing the interpretive principle that "repeals by implication are disfavored, ' 21 2 the
Court held that the legislative history of § 1983 "lends only the most
equivocal support" to the argument that § 1983 was intended to over2o5Allen, 449 U.S. at 103.
26

Id. at 103-04.

2w

Id. at 105.

208 See id. (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1975), and other cases).

The Court noted that Stone presented "this Court's emphatic reaffirmation ... of the constitutional obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and its expression of confidence in
their ability to do so." Id.
2
Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
210 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). The statute reads, in part: "[J]udicial proceedings [of any
court of any state] ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State...." Id.
211 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 97-99 (discussing the conflict between a broad reading of § 1983
and the Full Faith and Credit Act).
212 Id. at 99.
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ride the dictates of the Full Faith and Credit Act.213 The problem with
this reading of § 1983 as conflicting with the Full Faith and Credit
Act is that the drafters of § 1983 could not have thought, in 1871, that
the two laws were in conflict with each other. As Justice Blackmun
pointed out in his Allen dissent, "at the time § 1983 was passed, a
nonparty's ability,
4 a practical matter, to invoke collateral estoppel
' '2 as
was nonexistent. 1
Allen largely ignores the traditional requirement of "mutuality of
estoppel," which the authors of § 1983 would have taken for
granted.215 Mutuality of estoppel is the traditional common-law rule
that "a judgment was binding only on parties and persons in privity
with them, and [that] a judgment could be invoked only by parties and
their privies. 21 6 Thus, under the common law of 1871, state officials
sued in a subsequent § 1983 action would have been unable to defend
themselves by invoking a state-court judgment that they had not violated the § 1983 plaintiff's rights, unless they were "in privity" with
the state. Although state officials might have been able to raise this
argument in federal court in the 1880s or 1890s, it is unlikely that
such an argument would have prevailed.2 7 The better conclusion is
that of Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Allen: "no preclusive effect could arise out of a criminal proceeding that would affect subsequent civil litigation." 218 Thus, the drafters of § 1983 "could not have
anticipated" the preclusive effects of state criminal proceedings,2 19
and there is no difficulty in reading § 1983 as consistent with the Full
Faith and Credit Act. The fact that the statutes appeared to be in conflict in 1980 indicates nothing about the intentions of the drafters of §
1983 in 1871.
Once the apparent conflict between § 1983 and the Full Faith
and Credit Act is resolved in this way, § 1983's legislative purpose
213 m

214 I. at 114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Theis, supra note 204, at 866 ("Not
surprisingly, the [legislative] debates [in 1871] make no mention of res judicata questions....
However, the remarks in support of the legislation suggest that the debaters would not have
approved of the application of an expansive notion of res judicata in actions brought under the
legislation eventually adopted.").
215 The Allen Court largely ignores this difficulty, but does note that "the requirement of
mutuality of estoppel was still alive in the federal courts until well into this century,... [and
thus] the drafters of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. .. may have had less reason to concern themselves with rules of preclusion than a modem Congress would." Allen, 449 U.S. at 97. See also
Theis, supranote 204, at 866 n.38 ("Identity of the parties was a requirement of collateral estoppel at that time [1871].").
216 WRiGHT Er AL., supra note 45, § 4463.
217See iL (discussing the traditional "narrow" exception to the mutuality of estoppel requirement).
218 Allen, 449 U.S. at 114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219See id. at 114-15 ("Thus, the 42d Congress could not have anticipated or approved that
a criminal defendant, tried and convicted in state court, would be precluded from raising against
police officers a constitutional claim arising out of his arrest.").
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must dominate the analysis. Justice Blackmun argued in his Allen
dissent that "Congress consciously acted in the broadest possible
manner '22° in passing § 1983 because "justice was not being done in
the States then dominated by the Klan. '22 In that context "it seems
senseless to suppose that" 222 Congress intended state court proceedings to preclude access to a federal forum for the adjudication of federal rights, given the inability or unwillingness of the state courts to
protect federal rights at that time. 223 This version of the legislative
history leads to the conclusion that "§ 1983 embodies a strong congressional policy in favor of federal courts acting as the primary and
final arbiters of constitutional rights, 224 regardless of the availability
of a state forum. 225 Such a holding is the only one that makes sense
if, in the much-quoted language of Mitchum v. Foster, "'[t]he very
purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
' 226
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights.'
Justice Blackmun's Allen dissent, then, appears to be based on the
same understanding of § 1983 as Justice Souter's position in his Heck
and Spencer concurrences.
Justice Souter did not directly address the effect of Allen on his
position in Heck, but there is some indirect support for the reading
offered here. After stressing the importance of Congress's intent that
a federal forum be available, Justice Souter offered the following hypothetical:
Consider the case of a former slave framed by Ku Klux Klancontrolled law-enforcement officers and convicted by a Klancontrolled state court of, for example, raping a white woman;
and suppose that the unjustly convicted defendant did not
(and could not) discover the proof of unconstitutionality until
after his release from custody. If it were correct to say that §
1983 independently requires a person not in custody to establish the prior invalidation of his conviction, it would have
been equally right to tell the former slave that he could not
seek federal relief even against the law-enforcement officers
who framed him unless he first managed to convince the state
courts that his conviction was unlawful. That would be a result hard indeed to reconcile either with the purpose of §
Id. at 109.
22'Id. at 109-10.
220

22 Id. at 110.
2 See id. ("[lit seems senseless to suppose that [Congress] would have intended the federal courts to give full preclusive effect to prior state adjudications. That supposition would
contradict their obvious aim to right the wrongs perpetuated in [the state] courts.").
2A

Id.

2 See id. ("Congress passed the legislation in order to substitute a federal forum for the
ineffective, although plainly available, state remedies ....
")(citation omitted).
226Allen, 449 U.S. at 111 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).

20001

SECTION 1983 CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT

1983 or with the origins of what was "popularly known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act," the statute having been enacted in
part out of concern that many state courts were "in league
with those who
' 27 were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.
Although Justice Souter's immediate concern in this passage is
to reject Heck's favorable-termination requirement in favor of opening up access to a federal forum, this hypothetical-involving someone convicted of a state crime but subsequently released, prior to obtaining the information needed to file a habeas petition-appears to
require relitigation of issues previously decided in the state courts.
Like Heck's favorable-termination requirement, Allen's application of
modem issue-preclusion rules to § 1983 actions limits the access to a
federal forum of those, like the individual in the hypothetical, whose
federally protected rights have been violated. Given that Justice
Souter's reading of the purposes of § 1983 cannot be squared with a
favorable-termination requirement, it cannot be squared with the application of issue preclusion that would have effectively the same result.
Interestingly, following this hypothetical, Justice Souter cites the
legislative history of § 1983 to the effect "that, under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 'the Federal Government has a right to set aside ...action of the State authorities' that deprives a person of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights."228 Under this broad reading of the statute's purposes, then, the Forty-Second Congress actually intended for the federal courts to use § 1983 to set aside state convictions if those convictions violated the federal rights of criminal defendants. This reading
of § 1983 is premised on exactly the same "general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional
issues" that the Allen Court rejected. 229 Thus, as the Second Circuit
has recently interpreted Justice Souter's position, it makes sense to
argue that "some federal remedy--either habeas corpus or § 1983must be available." 0
Following this logic, then, issue preclusion, like the favorabletermination requirement, must give way before Congress's purpose in
ensuring access to a federal forum for those claiming an official vio-

227

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 501-02 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting

Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951); Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240).
22 ld. at 502 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist
Sess. 577 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull)).
Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.
2" Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a § 1983 suit by a
prisoner challenging the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect
the overall length of the prisoner's confinement is not barred by the Heck rule).
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lation of their federal rights.23 ' In the case of both issue preclusion
and favorable termination, Congress's determination that a federal
forum is necessary for the protection of federal rights greatly outweighs federalism concerns, such as federal-state comity. As discussed above, comity concerns cannot be separated from the issue of
parity. If there is not parity between the state and federal courts, then
concerns with maintaining friendly relations between the two
23 2 must
give way to the protection of federal rights in a federal forum.
In fact, if the Court grants that challenges to state convictions are
cognizable under § 1983 because of the necessity of a federal forum,
it would be inconsistent for it to hold that the prior state adjudication
precludes relitigation of federal claims. This would in effect give
with one hand what is taken away by the other, because those who
have not already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in a
state criminal trial have access to a federal forum through § 1983,
even under Allen. 3 3 Such a paradoxical result might be justified,
however, if the Court determined that the costs of opening the federal
courts to such actions, in terms of judicial resources and the finality of
decisions, outweighed the legislative goals behind the Civil Rights
Act of 187 1.234 Unlike comity, these important concerns can be
weighed independently of assessments of parity. Issue preclusion35
advances the important policies of conserving judicial resources2
and the finality of decisions.236 Finality is particularly important in
criminal cases, where punishment
must be meted out in a sure manner
237
to provide for deterrence.
Thus, it could reasonably be argued that
concerns about finality, coupled with already-overloaded federal
dockets, outweigh the necessity of a federal forum, especially in cases
not involving state custody. Part V addresses these issues.
2' Allen, 449 U.S. at 109 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Congress specifically made a determination that federal oversight of constitutional determinations through the federal courts was
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of constitutional rights.").
232 See Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 288 (arguing that "comity cannot operate as a
principle.., independent of parity").
23 See, e.g, Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff who
plead guilty in state court has not had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate an issue that was
not actually litigated in state court).
234 For an example of the view that concerns for judicial economy could outweigh the need
for a federal forum, see Neuborne, supra note 148, at 1117 ("[B]y uncritically assuming parity,
the Supreme Court has avoided the difficult, but critical, issue of whether concerns for federalism, efficiency, and caseload outweigh the importance of having constitutional claims heard by
the more sympathetic and competent forum.").
23- See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (indicating that "res judicata and collateral estoppel ... conserve judicial resources").

236 See id. (touching on the importance of finality in "preventing inconsistent decisions,"
thereby "encourag[ing] reliance on adjudication").
237 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441,441 (1963) (noting that in criminal cases, "our instinct is that
we must be sure before we proceed to the end [of the case], that we will not write an irrevocable
finis on the page until we are somehow truly satisfied that justice has been done").
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V. JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND FINALITY

As stated above, concerns with both judicial economy (i.e., the
federal courts' caseload) and the finality of criminal convictions
weigh against allowing § 1983 challenges to state convictions in federal courts. The nature of § 1983 challenges to state convictions not
involving custody, however, suggests that such concerns can be easily
overstated. In terms of judicial resources, it is unclear just how many
cases would be brought under § 1983 challenging state convictions
resulting in fines or other forms of non-custodial punishment. The
worst-case scenario, of course, is that the federal courts would
quickly be awash in frivolous cases involving small fines imposed by
states for misdemeanor convictions and other minor offenses, just as
the federal courts found themselves flooded with habeas petitions in
years past. But it is certainly not appropriate to compare the potential
effects of the availability of a federal forum under § 1983 to the large
number of habeas corpus petitions filed in the federal courts. With a
few exceptions, habeas petitions are filed by state prisoners, individuals with little to occupy their time and nothing to lose by filing a pro
se petition in federal court. As one commentator has noted:
"[C]ollateral attack may have become so much a way of prison life as
to have created its own self-generating force: it may now be considered merely something done as a matter of course during long incarceration."
It is unlikely that small fines would motivate many individuals to seek a federal forum, even if they believed that their federal
rights had been violated in some way, because, unlike state prisoners,
such individuals are free to go on with their lives. Moreover, unlike
prisoners, who have much to gain-physical freedom-in filing habeas petitions, individuals not in custody will often have little to gain
from pursuing
in the federal courts a matter already resolved in state
9

court.

This does not mean, however, that there are never significant and
important interests involved in non-custodial convictions. Large fines
imposed as part of a state criminal conviction, for example, would
implicate important individual interests. Suppose that a state criminal
defendant were fined $85,000 for illegally dispensing prescription
drugs, and that the state courts rejected his defense that he had not
received a fair trial because of the jury's exposure to biased media
coverage about the case.24° Because physical restraint is not involved,
238

Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments,

38 U. CM. L. REv. 142, 150 (1970).
239 Friendly points out that most habeas petitions fail. Thus, the number of habeas petitions filed can be traced at least in part to the lack of anything else better to do. See id.(noting
"the minute percentage" of habeas petitions granted).
m4 These were the facts in Barry v. Bergen County ProbationDep't, 128 F.3d 152 (3d Cir.
1997). However, because the state criminal defendant was also sentenced to community serv-
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the habeas corpus statute would not offer such an individual access to
a federal forum, despite the important interests involved. In addition
to protecting procedural rights, such as that to a fair trial, § 1983 actions could also be pursued to vindicate substantive federal rights.
Suppose that an individual was fined for violating a state statute that
infringes upon his or her freedom of speech, but that the state courts
upheld the conviction despite clear Supreme Court precedent to the
contrary. 241 Without access to a federal forum, such an individual
would have no recourse to vindicate his or her most important constitutional rights, despite clear precedent in his or her favor.242
Moreover, important federal rights might be at stake in cases involving corporations and nonprofit organizations, but these entities do not
have access to a federal forum through habeas corpus because they
cannot be placed "in custody. ' 43 This does not mean, however, that
they should never have access to a federal forum to vindicate their
federally protected rights. 244 In cases like these, the individuals or
corporations involved will have a real stake in the outcome of the
case and thus an incentive to bring a § 1983 action. At the same time,
it would be very difficult to argue that hearing such cases would be a
waste of valuable judicial resources, given the importance of the in-

terests involved. In short, judicial economy should not justify closing
the federal courts to § 1983 actions involving important interests, and
ice, in addition to the massive fine, the Third Circuit held that he was "in custody" and thus had
access to a federal forum by means of habeas corpus. If Barry had not been sentenced to community service, under Heck and Allen, he would have been unable to pursue his claim in federal
court despite the significant interests involved and the possible merit of his claim. (His habeas
petition was granted in the district court.) See id. at 154.
7A1 These were essentially the facts in Pringlev. Courtof Common Pleas, 778 F.2d 998 (3d
Cir. 1985). Pringle was convicted of disorderly conduct for the use of obscene language; despite the Supreme Court's holding in Hess v. Indiana,414 U.S. 105 (1973), that the language
she had used was protected by the First Amendment, the state courts affirmed her conviction.
See Pringle, 778 F.2d at 1000-03. However, because Pringle was sentenced to a short jail sentence, she had access to federal court through habeas corpus. See id. at 1000.
242 Here, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's certiorari review is not adequate
as a federal forum for policing the constitutional decisions of the state courts. See Bator, supra
note 237, at 513-14, for a discussion of the purposes of Supreme Court review. The argument
can be summarized in the following way:
As the Court has so often pointed out, it will not grant certiorari in a case merely because it thinks the case was erroneously decided: the purpose of the jurisdiction is to
have the Court resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen
among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower
federal courts. If [the Court] took every case in which... [its] primafacieimpression is that the decision below is erroneous, [it] could not fulfill the Constitutional
and statutory responsibilities placed upon [it].
Id. at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 See Waste Management, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
that a corporation cannot be "in custody" and thus cannot seek federal relief under the habeas
statute).
244 See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 10, § 2.3 ("Both businesses and nonprofit organizations are other persons authorized to assert claims under § 1983.").
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it is unlikely that many § 1983 actions involving unimportant interests
will be brought.
It could also be argued that the number of § 1983 actions that
would be filed by former state prisoners under these proposed
changes in the law would put a severe strain on the resources of the
federal courts. Under the approach advocated in this Note, state prisoners would be able to use § 1983 as, a means of challenging their
convictions after their release from prison. After a prisoner's release,
a federal district court would no longer have jurisdiction to consider
the habeas petition of a former prisoner, 245 and thus, under this reading--and following the logic of Justice Souter's Heck concurrencesuch an individual would have access to a federal forum using §
1983.246 Such prisoners might then defeat the exhaustion requirement
of the federal habeas corpus statute by sitting out their prison sentence, waitingfor their opportunity to bring a § 1983 action. 247 This
argument, however, fails to take into account the relatively short statute of limitations in § 1983 actions. The limitations period for a §
1983 action is the period applied in the courts of the state in which the
action arose for a personal injuries claim. 248 Because states have generally imposed short limitations periods on such torts claims, 49 a
prisoner seeking to evade the requirements of habeas corpus must be
certain that his or her release will occur before the statute has run.
Thus, any prisoner facing a sentence longer than the limitations period would have to pursue habeas corpus relief. A prisoner serving a
sentence that is shorter than the state's limitations period, on the other
hand, would have the option of waiting to file a § 1983 action, but it
seems unlikely that there are many prisoners willing to give up their
first opportunity for collateral review of their convictions. In addition, given that such individuals would have access to a federal forum
under the habeas statute before release, judicial resources would not
be conserved by restricting them to habeas corpus.
Similarly, finality concerns cannot justify closing the federal
courts to § 1983 actions challenging state convictions not involving
custody, because finality is a relatively minor concern in such cases.
The finality of judicial decisions plays an important role in encour24s See supra Part LB (discussing the jurisdictional element of "custody" under the federal

habeas statute).
246

See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing

the situation of those "who discover ...a constitutional violation after full expiration of their
sentences"); id. at 501 (discussing the hypothetical of the freed slave convicted by a Klancontrolled state court).
247 See supraPart ILA (discussing the strategic choices of the Preiserplaintiffs).
24
See SCHWARrZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 10, § 12.8 (discussing Wilson v. Garcia,471
U.S. 261 (1985), and related authority).
A9 For a list of statute of limitations for personal injury claims in most American jurisdictions, see id § 12.9. The average limitations period for these jurisdictions is 2.6 years, with
nearly half of the jurisdictions listed having a limitations period of only two years. See Ud
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aging reliance on judicial decisions, 250 but it is unclear what sort of
"reliance" concerns are at issue with fine-only sanctions or other
forms of non-custodial punishment. As Justice Souter pointed out in
his Heck concurrence, a successful § 1983 action involves "a significantly less disruptive remedy than an order compelling release from
custody.' 251 After the state imposes the fine, or other non-custodial
punishment, the § 1983 plaintiff would bring an action challenging
the conviction and, if he or she prevailed, may receive relief, including damages and reimbursement of the fine imposed. 2 Such a result
would have little effect on the state government because the state
government will have placed little reliance on the prior judgment at
all. In this respect, non-custodial punishments raise much less of a
finality concern than do custodial punishments, which involve continuous state action in the form of incarceration and thus greater reliance on the conviction. The state's reliance on a criminal conviction
resulting in a prison sentence is much greater, given the ongoing nature of the punishment involved.253
To illustrate this point, take the case of an individual who serves
a short sentence, does not pursue habeas corpus relief, and is released
after his or sentence expires. The state's concerns with finality have
actually been satisfied, as the punishment has been fully meted out.
The same holds true for fine-only convictions and other non-custodial
sentences. In short, while finality and the state's reliance on the conviction are important considerations, they cannot outweigh the necessity of a federal forum in cases not involving custody.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that § 1983 should be interpreted broadly
to allow individuals without access to a federal forum under the federal habeas corpus statute to challenge their state convictions in federal court. Such a result is consistent with the legislative purpose of §
1983 and the primary role of the federal courts as the guardians of the
federally protected rights of individuals. Despite a number of precedents in recent decades limiting access to a federal forum to challenge
state actions, several members of the current Supreme Court have
shown a renewed interest in providing a federal forum for those
claiming that their federal rights have been violated. There are good
reasons to think that the federal courts are better suited to protect fed250 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 33, § 14.3 (discussing reliance and finality).
251 Heck, 512 U.S. at 502 (Souter, J., concurring).
252 In Waste Management, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 139 (7th Cir. 1980), for example,
the § 1983 corporate-plaintiff requested relief including the expungement of the record of its
conviction, reimbursement of the fine paid, and an injunction restraining state officials from
taking any action based on the record of the conviction.
253 See Bator, supra note 237, at 441.
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eral rights than the state courts-reasons stemming from the quality
and characteristics of the federal bench, the insulation of federal
judges from political or majoritarian pressures, and historical experience. Section 1983 reflects the Forty-Second Congress's determination that the state courts could not be trusted to protect federal rights
and thus that access to a federal forum was necessary. Once this important role of the federal courts is recognized, however, it becomes
necessary to reconsider and ultimately reject Allen v. McCurry. This
Note has argued that Allen's application of issue preclusion to § 1983
actions is inconsistent with both the legislative history and purposes
of § 1983. In addition, Allen is difficult to reconcile with the majority
position in Spencer. Thus, an action challenging a state criminal conviction should be cognizable under § 1983, even though the state
courts had provided an opportunity for the litigation of the matter in
the first instance, unless the § 1983 plaintiff has access to the federal
courts by means of the habeas corpus statute. Neither finality nor
judicial economy should override the important legislative purpose
behind § 1983, providing a federal forum for the protection of federal
rights.
EMERY G. LEE Ilt
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